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Abstract
This paper examines the performance and the diversification benefits of
U.S.-registered, active, global real estate mutual funds (GREMFs). It consid-
ers both the industry as a whole and 76 individual funds, relative to a global
and to a domestic benchmark, and before and net of expenses. We estimate
alpha, the conditional outperformance, and use the cross-sectional wild boot-
strap method to separate funds with genuine skills from merely lucky ones. We
find that the actively-managed GREMF industry, as a whole, displays no skills
to beat either the global or the domestic benchmarks, even before deduction
of expenses. The latter result suggests that there is no benefit from interna-
tional real estate investment. We also undertake recursive estimates of alpha
and conclude that, after an initial period when there were fewer than five funds,
there has been no evidence of skills. At the individual fund level, against the
global benchmark, we find only one skilled fund but only before expenses are
deducted; and, against the domestic benchmark, we find one after the deduction
of expenses. Against both benchmarks, we find a number of funds which dis-
play a significant lack of skills rather than bad luck, particularly once expenses
are taken into account. We undertake a series of robustness checks, including
using different benchmarks, and conclude that our results are robust. We also
explore possible explanations of performance and conclude that it is linked to
over-weighting portfolios in countries/regions with higher economic growth and
better investor protection.
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1 Introduction
The last three decades have witnessed a strong growth in global sector mutual funds,
from 26 in 1992 to 291 in 2016, and a growth in assets under management from
$4.5bn to $198bn. Of the 291, 196 were actively-managed and accounted for $170bn
of the assets. Of the actively-managed sector funds, the real estate sector, with 82,
had the largest number of funds and the second largest assets under management
at $41bn.1 Accordingly, it is appropriate to investigate the performance of actively-
managed mutual funds, specifically the actively-managed Global Real Estate Mutual
Funds (GREMFs).
Although identifying underpriced international equities could bring return and
geographical risk diversification benefits, significant efforts and costs are involved as
different countries have different institutional contexts and different levels of market
transparency and maturity. For their supposed skills, actively-managed mutual
funds charge much higher expenses than passive funds, with GREMFs, on average,
charging the highest expenses (155 basis points) among different types of funds.2
However, despite the importance to investors, there is limited published research on
whether such expenses are justified by fund performance.
In general, managers who are based in a local area may have specialist knowl-
edge and access to information, leading to information asymmetry between local and
non-local investors, and enabling the former better to assess the value of securities.
For example, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that mutual funds that invest heavily
in their local market do better. As the international real estate market is charac-
terised by a high degree of market-specific, value-relevant, local factors, information
about which is generally less accessible and transparent to outside investors, the
information asymmetry is likely to be even more evident for GREMFs (Hung and
Glascock, 2010). Accordingly, it may be more difficult for them to outperform the
local market.
A potential counter-argument in real estate investment relates to the cost of
information that, for example, for the real estate investment trust (REIT) industry
is higher than for other stocks, which ensures an information advantage for REIT
portfolio managers over small retail investors (Kallberg et al., 2000). Managers may
also outperform as a result of information advantage from insiders. Damodaran and
Liu (1993) suggest that managers specialising in the real estate sector may have
superior private information, mainly due to the appraisal process. These insiders
can access private information prior to its public release, which may have a material
impact on REIT and real estate operating companies (REOC) pricing. And this will
cause greater information asymmetry in the real estate market than other industries,
1Healthcare is the largest by assets under management at $66.5bn in 2016 but only had 10 funds.
2Based on the expense ratio data from CRSP US Mutual Fund database, and ICI Investment
Company Institute 2016.
2
and could ensure that the better-informed active REMF managers can beat the
market. To what extent these factors might apply to global funds is moot.
To assess outperformance, we employ the alpha measure, which has been widely
used to examine fund performance, including in studies of domestic REMFs and
international equity mutual funds. Previous studies suggest that the results are
sensitive to the choice of benchmarks (Cumby and Glen, 1990; Lin and Yung, 2004;
Hartzell et al., 2010). Various benchmarks have been used, among which the most
frequently used are passive real estate sector indices and asset pricing models based
on the required returns of a passive portfolio.
We contribute to the empirical literature by examining the skills of U.S.-registered
GREMFs that invest in securitized real estate investments outside of the U.S. We
consider both gross and net performance. We use a seven risk-factor global model as
the benchmark. This includes three factors, for market risk, size and book/market
ratio derived from Fama and French (1993) and two, for profitability and invest-
ment, from Fama and French (2012, 2015). To these, we add a momentum factor
from Carhart (1997) and a global real estate sector factor. The proposed risk factor
model is empirically and theoretically driven, and variants of it are well-established
in the literature of global mutual funds and REMFs. We compare the results of
our seven-factor benchmark with those from the Fama-French five-factor model, the
Carhart four-factor models (comprising the Fama-French three-factor model plus
a momentum factor) and a real estate benchmark. We consider both global and
domestic versions of each. We undertake our analysis for the GREMF sector as a
whole and for individual funds. For the former, we also undertake recursive and
rolling estimates of alpha to consider its time trend.
Our study also contributes to the literature by applying an appropriate method-
ological perspective. Recent studies show that some mutual funds may have talents
(Kosowski et al., 2006; Fama and French, 2010; Berk and Van Binsbergen, 2015).
However, identifying managers with skills is a non-trivial exercise because good past
performance could simply be the result of luck. Moreover, even if managers are
talented enough to generate gross outperformance, it is possible that this would be
cancelled by their operating expenses. We address statistical issues that hinder the
appraisal of performance, namely non-normality and heteroscedasticity, and which
were not considered in studies such as Shen et al. (2012) and Ferreira et al. (2013).
These are the product of fund managers’ heterogeneous risk-taking behaviors and
we address them by implementing a cross-sectional wild bootstrap (Flachaire, 2005;
Kosowski et al., 2006; Davidson et al., 2007; Davidson and Flachaire, 2008), which
enables us to separate skills from luck.
Finally, to investigate the factors affecting a fund superior performance, we esti-
mate a panel regression and include, as explanatory variables, characteristics of the
global markets within which a fund invests, with various fund’s attributes, such as
size, age, expenses, loads and management structure as control variables.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the literature on the
3
performance of actively managed GREMFs. Section 3 explains the data used in
this study. Section 4 then outlines the methodology, specifically the benchmark
models for global markets. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and section 6
summarises the main findings and draws conclusions.
2 Literature Review
There is a long-established literature on the performance of diversified active funds
with a U.S. market focus (Grinblatt and Titman, 1989; Ippolito, 1993; Elton et al.,
1993; Malkiel, 1995; Gruber, 1996; Carhart, 1997). The general conclusion is that,
on average, active funds underperform passive alternatives and show no evidence of
outperformance after expenses have been taken into account.
More recent studies draw similar conclusions. Kosowski et al. (2006), in their
examination of the returns of U.S. domestic equity mutual funds from 1975 to 2002,
find that a minority of funds possess genuine skills to produce outperformance when
operating expenses are taken into account. Similar results are found by Fama and
French (2010) and Barras et al. (2010). Fama and French (2010) examine the net
returns of active diversified equity funds from 1984 to 2006 and find that only the
top three percentiles funds can add enough value to cover the expenses imposed, and
this is attributed to their stock-picking talents. Barras et al. (2010), in a study of net
fund performance from 1975 to 2006, find that 10-15% of the 2076 funds are skilled
during different periods before 1996 but none thereafter. They attribute this to
increasing market efficiency, inadequate skills of fund managers, and the movement
of skilled fund managers to the more lucrative sectors, such as hedge funds.
There is also evidence that funds that concentrate in specific industries perform
better than those that do not (Kacperczyk et al. (2005)). This is explained by
information asymmetry, which means that these managers know their sectors better
than other types of fund managers (Kaushik et al., 2010). Nonetheless, Khorana and
Nelling (1997) suggest that the overall risk levels of sector funds are indistinguishable
from small-cap or aggressive-growth funds. Studies which have considered sector
funds (Dellva et al., 2001; Tiwari and Vijh, 2001; Eakins and Stansell, 2007; Kaushik
et al., 2010) find that some sectors, such as technology, health care and utilities, can
outperform but only during specific periods. However, superior performance may
come from luck rather than genuine managerial skills. The need to include a sector-
based index in the established asset pricing benchmarks, to account for their sector
specific investment styles, has been addressed by most studies (Dellva et al., 2001;
Tiwari and Vijh, 2001; Eakins and Stansell, 2007; Kaushik et al., 2010).
As the largest sector among all mutual fund sectors, domestic real estate is
the most extensively studied. Earlier studies by Kallberg et al. (2000) and Gallo
et al. (2000) find outperformance when real estate market returns are poor, which is
attributed to real estate market inefficiency. However, more recent studies (O’Neal
4
and Page, 2000; Lin and Yung, 2004; Rodriguez, 2007; Chiang et al., 2008)) find
little or no evidence to support significant outperformance attributable to REMF
managers’ superior skills, regardless of the benchmarks used for the market or the
real estate sector.
The performance of international property companies has been examined by
Eichholtz et al. (2011) during 1996-2007. Their results indicate that such companies
underperformed local property companies in the earlier years because of the polit-
ical environment, the level of economic integration and transparency of the target
real estate markets. However, in later years, the underperformance of international
property companies vanished, suggesting increased market transparency in the in-
ternational real estate industry. Shen et al. (2012) considered GREMFs and found
that the performance of international REMFs is time-dependent. They evaluate the
performance of 59 U.S.-based GREMFs during 1998-2008 and conclude that, be-
fore 2007, GREMFs outperformed domestic REMFs but this advantage disappears
thereafter.
Finally, the issue of non-normality in fund returns has not been addressed by
any study of global mutual fund performance. Ample empirical evidence has been
found to show the violation of the normality assumption (Kosowski et al., 2006;
Fama and French, 2010; Cuthbertson et al., 2008) because of small samples and
heteroskedasticity. To control for this in our study, a cross-sectional wild bootstrap
has been employed.
3 Data
3.1 Mutual Fund Data
We consider the monthly performance of GREMFs from January 1992 to Decem-
ber 2016. The data for GREMFs come from the survivor-bias free US mutual fund
database of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). This database pro-
vides a comprehensive coverage of mutual funds, including monthly return rates,
total net asset values, operating expenses, turnover ratios, and front and rear load
charges. From December 2002 onward, the database also provides details on the
security holdings in fund portfolios.3
In line with earlier studies, we start our sample in January 1992 and we cover
the period up to December 2016. The focus of our study is an examination of the
performance of U.S.-registered GREMFs. In the CRSP database, the GREMFs are
classified by Lipper4 as U.S.-based equity funds investing more than 25% of their
assets in foreign real estate securities. However, after 2008, the CRSP definition was
3The method used to identify portfolio holdings is explained in Appendix 1.
4CRSP mutual funds adopt the classification and codes provided by Lipper, based on the infor-
mation from fund prospectuses and their investments.
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changed and two new classifications of GREMFs5 were introduced to take account
of differing degrees of international investment, but these have missing histories. To
deal with this, we define global funds as both the IRE and GRE categories and
create historical data for the full period. We use the Lipper classification currently
used by CRSP and identify GREMFs during 2002-2016 based on portfolio holdings.
As the portfolio holding data in CRSP only starts from December 2002, before this
we assume that funds have no significant investment policy changes with regard to
their geographical investment focus.6
Mutual funds tend to offer different share classes to investors, where the classes
differ regarding their contribution to annual operating expenses including manage-
ment expenses, brokerage commissions, distribution fees (12b-1 fees) and other gen-
eral expenses. In addition, the share classes also differ with respect to additional
share-class-specific charges, such as front-end loads, back-end loads or deferred sales
charges, which accommodate investors’ heterogeneous investment horizons and tax
requirements. The CRSP mutual fund database reports monthly net returns for
each share class. We aggregated the net returns of the different share classes by
using a weighted average, with the total net assets (TNAs) of the share classes as
weights.7 This fund net return is the return that the average investor receives after
operating expenses. Next, we calculated the fund gross monthly return. For each
share class, we added 1/12th of its yearly expense ratio to its net return to obtain
its gross return, and then aggregate same-portfolio share class gross returns to ob-
tain the fund gross return.8 As we want to examine the performance of all active
GREMFs, we ignore all passively-managed GREMFs.9
Table 1 shows, for each year of the sample period, the number of such active
GREMFs (Nt), the total net asset value of GREMFs industry (TNAt =
∑
TNAi,t),
5There are two types of GREMFs Global Real Estate (GRE) and International Real Estate
(IRE) defined by the proportions of real estate investment outside the U.S. GRE are funds that
invest at least 25% but less than 75% of their equity portfolio in shares of companies engaged
in the real estate industry that are strictly outside of the U.S. or whose securities are principally
traded outside of the U.S. IRE are funds that invest at least 75% of their equity portfolio in shares
of companies engaged in the real estate industry that are strictly outside of the U.S. or whose
securities are principally traded outside of the U.S.
6According to SEC and Investment Company Act 1940, any strategic change to fund policy
needs to be notified to SEC and disclosed in the prospectus.
7The data directly reported from CRSP are at the share class level, and have to be aggregated to
generate the data for the fund family. We split the ‘fund name’ by semicolon into the fund family
name and share class. We also additionally adopted the approach in Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu
(2009), by using the management company as the identifier for the share classes in the same fund
family.
8Net Return as reported in CRSP = Gross Return (Return before Operating Expenses) - Oper-
ating Expenses. If a fund’s expense ratio is missing for certain years, we assume it is the same as
other actively managed funds with similar assets under management (AUM). Then the fund share
classes can be aggregated to get the gross returns at the fund level (Fama and French, 2010).
9We follow the procedure of Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009) to identify passively-managed funds
- details of the procedure are presented in Appendix A.2
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The second and the third columns show that the number of funds and money under
management were mostly increasing throughout the period. The growth of the sector
also resulted in a less concentrated distribution of funds, implied by the decreasing
figures for the Herfindahl Index. The GREMF investment by regions is shown in
Table 2. Analysis of fund portfolio holdings using the information available since
2002 reveals that, on average, about 60% of funds’ assets are invested in U.S. real
estate securities, 20% in Pacific Asian markets, 15% in European markets and the
remaining funds in the African, Latin American and Middle Eastern markets. It
is evident that there is a shift of investments from the U.S. to Pacific Asian and
European markets after 2010.
[Table 1 about here]
[Table 2 about here]
3.2 Real Estate Benchmark Data
The choice of a real estate benchmark to measure the performance of GREMFs
requires an understanding of the risk exposure of their portfolios. As GREMFs hold
predominantly global REITs and REOCs, we employ the FTSE EPRA/NAREIT
global developed index as the passive global real estate sector benchmark. This
index is constructed to represent the real estate equities market in most developed
regions worldwide, covering over 95% of the global markets and with a similar risk
profile to GREMFs,10 thus it has been used in the literature as a global benchmark
(Shen et al., 2012). For the domestic real estate benchmark, we use the Wilshire
U.S. Real Estate Securities Index.11
Table 3 gives summary statistics for the value-weighted12 and equal-weighted
portfolios of global and domestic REMFs, and the global and domestic real estate
indices, of monthly returns in excess of the risk-free rate from January 1992 to
December 2016.
[Table 3 about here]
10https://www.ftse.com/products/indices/epra-nareit
11The Wilshire U.S. Real Estate Securities Index measures US publicly-traded real estate secu-
rities. It is designed to offer a market-based index that is of the public real estate market and
comprises publicly-traded real estate equity securities. It has been widely used in the REMF liter-
ature.
12We use total net assets of each fund as the weights.
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On average, U.S. domestic REMFs generated higher excess returns than their global
counterparts, and the domestic real estate index beat the global real estate index.
In addition to lower excess returns, the GREMF industry is less volatile than the
domestic REMF industry, as indicated by its smaller standard deviation. This calls
for a risk-adjusted measure for the performance of GREMFs.
4 Methodology
4.1 Asset Pricing Models
In return-based performance studies, the observed returns are regressed on risk
factors that mimic a passive benchmark with a similar exposure to market risk. The
regression includes an intercept term, alpha, which should be zero if the observed
returns just compensate for the risk taken. The global funds literature suggests this
benchmark can be chosen from either domestic asset pricing models (Shen et al.,
2012) or domestic mutual funds (Engstrom, 2003). We test four variants of asset
pricing models in this study. For each, we use a global version and a domestic
version. The general specification is
ri = αiιi + Xβi + εi . (2)
where:
ri is the (Ti× 1) vector of fund i monthly excess return rate or the excess return
rate of an equal-weighted/value-weighted portfolio of funds;
ιi is a (Ti × 1) vector of ones;
X is (Ti ×K) matrix13 consisting of:
(REt) for the real estate sector model;
(MKTt, SMBt, HMLt,MOMt)
′
for the Carhart model;
(MKTt, SMBt, HMLt, CMAt, RMWt)
′
for the Fama and French five-factor model;
(MKTt, SMBt, HMLt,MOMt, CMAt, RMWt, REt)
′
for the seven-factor model.
REt is the real estate excess return rate, at month t;
14
MKTt is the return of the value-weighted aggregate market portfolio of traded
stocks, in excess of U.S. one month T-bill rate;15
13K is the number of risk factors.
14For the global analysis, we use the FTSE EPRA/NAREIT global developed index; and for the
domestic analysis we use the Wilshire U.S. real estate securities index.
15For the global market, the traded stocks are from 23 developed markets from four regions:
North America, which includes the U.S. and Canada; Japan; Asia-Pacific, which includes Australia,
New Zealand, Hong Kong and Singapore; and Europe, which includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the U.K. (Fama and French, 2015).
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SMBt is the size risk factor; HML is the value/growth risk factor; RMW is the
profitability risk factor; and CMA is the investment risk factor (Fama and French,
2015);16
MOMt is the momentum risk factor, is attributed to the past return momentum
(Carhart, 1997).17
We use the global factor model to investigate performance, and the domestic
factor model to consider diversification benefits, based on the review of studies on
global funds performance.18
The appropriateness of the above four types of models as benchmarks for GREMFs
is tested using value-weighted portfolios of all global passive funds. If an asset pric-
ing model explains the expected returns of an asset, the intercept is indistinguishable
from zero in the time series regression of any asset’s excess returns on the model’s
factors (Fama and French, 2015, 2018). The approach to the estimation of the risk
factor loads by the generalized method of moments (GMM) has been popularized
in the finance literature, as it can accommodate potential autocorrelation and het-
eroscedasticity. We run GMM regressions on the global passive portfolios and the
four benchmark models factor models (a real estate index factor; the Carhart four-
factor model; the Fama French five-factor model; and the seven-factor model), with
the coefficient t-statistic estimates adjusted using heteroscedasticity and autocorre-
lation robust standard errors (Kiefer and Vogelsang, 2002).
According to the result from the test using the GRS robust statistic (Gibbons
et al., 1989), we find that all alphas for 16 global passive mutual fund portfolios
are statistically jointly indifferent from zero for three of the benchmarks, implying
that the global Carhart model, Fama and French five-factor model, and seven-factor
model are appropriate to assess risks and performance for GREMFs. The exception
is the real estate index factor model, both domestic and global, so we do not use it.
In this study, we report the results of performance evaluation from the seven-factor
benchmark model.19
4.2 The Bootstrap Procedure
In Eq. 2, if the manager of fund i has skills relative to the benchmark, then αi > 0.
However, because this alpha is not observed and has to be estimated, inference has to
16These are constructed from either the U.S. domestic stock market portfolios for domestic bench-
mark, or the global stock market portfolios for global benchmark. The latter two factors are mo-
tivated by dividend discount valuation theory and market anomalies associated with profitability
and investment.
17All five factors are available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html.
18This is due to the unsettled argument between international pricing models and home country
pricing models (Cumby and Glen, 1990; Redman et al., 2000; Griffin, 2002).
19The detailed results using the Carhart four-factor model and the Fama-French five-factor are
not materially different.
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be conducted correctly. An unskilled fund manager could have a positive estimated
alpha simply by good luck. If we assume that the idiosyncratic return components,
εi,t, are independently, identically and normally distributed, then we could test the
null of αi = 0 using the standard t-test, where this statistic should be asymptotically
normally-distributed under the null. However, given the short history of many
GREMFs, this asymptotic result might be of no relevance for the true distribution
of the test statistic under the null. Nor could we assume that the idiosyncratic return
component is independently, identically and normally-distributed because, according
to Kosowski et al. (2006), the presence of idiosyncratic risk-taking among funds
makes this assumption unrealistic.20 Further, there is ample empirical evidence
that returns of stocks follow non-normal distributions, so portfolios consisting of
such stocks can exhibit similar non-normal characteristics.
Instead of relying on an asymptotic parametric distribution for inference, we
adopt the basic approach of Kosowski et al. (2006), and incorporate the wild cross-
sectional bootstrap to simulate the cross-sectional distribution of estimated alpha
t-statistics under the null that fund managers have no skills. This approach allows us
to separate luck from skills in the non-normally distributed cross-section of ranked
GREMFs (by the t-statistics of the estimated alphas).
We use the cross-sectional bootstrap approach and incorporate a wild bootstrap
procedure, which has been shown to perform well for the simulation of null dis-
tributions when the data generating process is characterized by heteroscedasticity
of unknown form (Flachaire, 2005; Davidson et al., 2007; Davidson and Flachaire,
2008). We present the steps of implementation as follows:
In step one, for each of the I funds21, we estimate the regression (in Eq. 2)
to get the actual performance α̂i and associated t̂i. In step two, we re-estimate the
regression under the restriction of an unskilled manager, that is without the constant
(αi = 0). We keep the estimated vector of factor loadings, β̃i, and the vector of re-
centered residuals, ε̃i. In step three, we generate pseudo return rate histories of each
fund rbi = 0+Xβ̃i +Υ
b
i ε̃i, where Υ
b
i has realizations of the Rademacher distribution
on the diagonal and zeros otherwise.22
Consider now the first bootstrap replication (b=1), which gives us {rbi}b=1, the
first set of pseudo return rate histories under the restriction that the manager of fund
i has no skill. In step four, we fit the regression (in Eq. 2) for each of the I funds to
get α̂bi , from the first bootstrap replication, b = 1. To construct alpha t-statistics, we
estimate the standard error of α̂bi with the heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance
20The non-normality is exacerbated when a fund invests heavily in a few stocks or industries, or
is involved in dynamic trading strategies.
21We use all 76 funds that have at least 36 return observations during 1992-2016 to minimize esti-
mation error. We follow Kosowski et al. (2006) when dealing with funds that have non-consecutive
returns.
22Realizations of the distribution are υ ∈ {−1, 1} with P (υ = −1) = P (υ = 1) = 0.5. It has been
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on the diagonal and zeros elsewhere. In Eq. 4, ε̂bi,t is the residual from the full
regression for the actual return rates of each fund, saved from step one. zi,tt is the
t’th diagonal element of the hat matrix Zi(Z
′
iZi)
−1Z′i. So, the t-statistic of alpha
for fund i after bootstrapping once is computed as {t̂bi}b=1 = t̂bi = α̂bi/σ̂bi . The actual
fund alpha t-statistic is computed in the same way.
In step five, after completing one draw of the bootstrapped alpha t-statistics, we
sort the cross-section of funds by the t-statistics {t̂bi}b=1.
In step six, we repeat the steps above for a further 999 bootstrap iterations
b = 2 . . . , B, where B = 1000. We now have the cross-sectional distribution of
funds, sorted by rank, for each of 1000 iterations, under the null that the true
alpha equals zero. Thus, for example, the distribution of the top ranked GREMF
is generated from the largest alpha t-statistics from all bootstrap iterations under
assumption of null.23 When we find that the actual alpha t-statistic is larger than all
pseudo values generated from bootstrap, we can conclude that sampling variation
is not the only cause for this performance, and that this fund has skill. We can
estimate the marginal significance level or bootstrapped p-value of each fund by
comparing t̂i with its associated cross-sectional bootstrapped t-statistics with the
same rank, which can help us to draw inferences on the existence of an individual
fund manager’s genuine skill among the cross-section of funds.
To assess if the GREMF industry, as a whole, has skilled managers or, on average,
has diversification advantages, we compute for each month the returns of a portfolio
that invests in all individual active GREMFs available. The returns of the GREMF
industry portfolio are calculated as both the equal-weighted and the value-weighted
averages of all existing active GREMFs. This implies that this GREMF industry
portfolio is re-balanced monthly. We then fit the benchmark models from Eq. 2 to
the returns of this active GREMFs portfolio. This produces an estimate of the actual
alpha and its t-statistic. To assess if the portfolio alpha is statistically different from
zero, we need to construct the simulated distribution of alpha estimates under the
null hypothesis that managers on average have no talent. To do so, we estimate
the bootstrapped alpha and the t-statistic for each of the 1000 notional returns
23And these bootstrapped largest alpha t-statistics may come from different funds at each itera-
tion.
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data, generated under the null with the bootstrap. We use the same benchmark
model in these regressions as was used in the regression for the actual returns.
Effectively, we fit Equation 2. For each regression, we obtain the estimated alpha
and its t-statistic, which is computed using heteroscedasticity consistent covariance
estimator in Equation 3.24 As we have 1000 bootstrapped observations for each
fund, we can use their bootstrapped distributions to assess if the actual alpha of a
portfolio is really significant and, accordingly, draw inferences on whether managers,
on average, have skills.25
4.3 Fund Performance and Regional Investments
We study the potential linkage between GREMF performance and fund portfolio
holdings in global markets, to see how country characteristics, such as economic
conditions (GDP per capita), financial market development and law enforcement
protection, are related to fund risk-adjusted performance. A set of fund character-
istics has been employed as the control variables, including fund size, age, expenses
and fees, fund flows and management structure.
The existing literature provides no conclusive findings on the effect of fund size
on fund performance. Large funds may have advantages over smaller ones owing to
economies of scale from allocating costs over a larger asset base but, on the other
hand, they may also face potential dis-economies of scale. Chen et al. (2004) find
that fund returns decrease with the lagged fund size, owing to the organizational
dis-economies. They suggest that liquidity may be an important reason explaining
why size erodes performance. According to their findings, the relationship is most
pronounced for funds investing in small-cap, illiquid equities.
Similarly, the relationship between fund age and performance also remains un-
clear. A younger fund is more at risk of failure owing to lack of experience but may
also be more likely to outperform by taking large risks. Ferreira et al. (2013) find
no significant relation between age and funds invested inside the U.S. but a negative
relationship between age and fund performance for funds invested outside of the
U.S., with younger funds performing better.
The impact of fees and expenses on fund performance is typically considered as
negative, since they are regarded as the price paid by investors to fund managers.
24This procedure is essentially the same as for the individual funds except that there is no rank-
ing to be undertaken as there is only one portfolio. We use the Davidson-MacKinnon (HC3)
heteroscedasticity consistent covariance estimator.
25We also implemented the block bootstrap, which re-samples a subset of consecutive values
of residuals, instead of each individual residual, to cope with autocorrelation among residuals.
The block length of residuals is set as optimal to reflect the significant autocorrelation among
fund’s returns accurately, as T 1/3 (Hall et al., 1995), without imposing independence assumption
on the residuals. We adopted the bootstrap with block length as 7 (T 1/3) but also used 3, 5 and
10 monthly returns. Since the results from the bootstrap with different block lengths have no
qualitative differences from the wild bootstrap results, we do not present the analysis here.
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Some studies find evidence supporting negative relationships between expenses and
performance before or net of expenses (Carhart, 1997; Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu,
2009). But a study by Chen et al. (2004) finds no statistically significant relationship
between expenses and performance.
Funds also charge investors front- and back-end loads to discourage the redemp-
tion of shares, and 12b-1 fees at the fund level for promotion or marketing purposes.
The relationship between loads and performance has been found either negative
(Carhart, 1997) or insignificant (Chen et al., 2004) in the literature.
According to the ‘smart money’ hypothesis proposed by Gruber (1996), fund flow
is positively related with future performance since investors can detect and reward
the skilled managers by investing in them. Empirical evidence has been found by
Gruber (1996) to support this hypothesis. Ferreira et al. (2013) find that the smart
money effect is more evident in the global market, suggesting that investors are
better at detecting skilled managers outside of the U.S.
Whether a fund is team- or individually-managed is also a factor to consider
when forecasting future performance. Funds managed by a team may perform bet-
ter than those managed by individual managers, as a result of being relatively free
of constraints of resources and networks. However, team-management structure is
considered to be less efficient in terms of the coordination of personnel and organi-
sation. Massa et al. (2010) and Ferreira et al. (2013) find that team-managed funds
performed worse than those managed individually.
The level of economic development may also be a factor. On the one hand, a
country with high economic development is associated with a better educated work-
force, which is likely to increase the possibility of skilled managers. On the other, it
is likely to imply a more transparent real estate market, which might reduce infor-
mation asymmetry and decrease the probability of outperformance. Ferreira et al.
(2013) find a negative relationship between per capita GDP and fund performance.
The characteristics of the stock market of a country may also play an important
role in fund performance. A better-developed financial infrastructure could enable
higher liquidity and lower trading costs for investors. The law enforcement system
of a country may also affect fund performance. Ferreira et al. (2013) find that a
common law system, compared with a civil law system, has a positive impact on
fund performance.
For active global funds, we analyze the relationship between fund performance
and the characteristics of the countries in which the funds invest, and we use fund
characteristics as control variables. As a result of missing data before 2001, we focus
on the period 2002-16 and run the OLS regression on the cross-section of individual
funds.26 The dependent variable is the net alpha. The explanatory variables include
26As there is a possible problem with endogeneity, the estimated regression coefficients only
indicate a relationship, not causality. Future work is required to find appropriate instrumental
variables or other exogenous variation that would make it possible to identify causal effects.
13
fund control variables, and weighted country characteristics. The list of explanatory
variables is as follows:
TNAi is fund i ’s size in millions of U.S. dollars;
Agei is the number of years since a fund’s launch date;
ERi is fund i ’s annual expense ratio;
Loadi is the sum of fund i ’s front- and back-end loads fees;
Flowi is the growth rate of TNA as Flowi,t = [TNAi,t−TNAi,t−1(1+ri,t)]/TNAi,t−1,
where ri,t is the cumulative return between fund’s inception and present date (Berk
and Green, 2004; Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu, 2009);
Teami is the bivariate variable to indicate whether fund i is managed by more
than one person or team-managed;
wi,j is the weight of fund i ’s investment in each country j, computed by the
percentage of market value of fund i ’s holding securities from the same market
divided by fund i ’s total market value. We weight the following three country
characteristics for each fund;
GDPj is GDP per capita in U.S. dollars for each country j invested by fund i,
quoted from World Development Indicators (WDI);27
Liqj , is a measure of stock market liquidity, the turnover ratio - the ratio of total
value of stocks traded to market capitalization for country j from WDI (Ferreira
et al., 2013).
DLaw,j is a dummy variable with value one for a common law system of country
j and zero otherwise.
5 Empirical Results
We use global and domestic versions of a seven-factor benchmark to assess the per-
formance of the GREMF industry, and of individual funds. This benchmark contains
the Fama-French five factors plus the Carhart momentum factor and a real estate
index. We consider returns both before and net of operating expenses. The domestic
benchmark enables us to consider the possible benefits of global diversification by
GREMFs.28
27http://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/
28We also undertook the analyses using the Carhart four-factor model and the Fama-French
five-factor model but, as the results are very similar, we do not generally report them.
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5.1 Performance of the GREMF Industry
The performance and associated statistical significance of the GREMFs industry,
relative to three global benchmarks, are presented in Table 4.
[Table 4 about here]
Compared with the benchmarks, both equal- and value-weighed portfolios of
GREMFs show no significant outperformance at the gross returns level. The gross
alphas are either insignificantly positive or, in the case of the value-weighted Fama-
French five-factor model, insignificantly negative. This result holds for both the
assumption of normality and when the empirical bootstrapped distribution is used.
Net of expenses, the estimated alpha is insignificantly negative for all but the equal-
weighted Carhart model, for which it is insignificantly positive.
In summary, there is no evidence that GREMF fund managers, as a whole, can
demonstrate skills even before expenses are taken into account. This is consistent
with earlier findings in the literature on GREMFs (Shen et al., 2012).
5.1.1 Industry Performance from Recursive and Rolling Estimation of
Alpha
Particularly after the 1990s, the REITs market, which is the main investment ve-
hicle for REMFs, has matured through growth and the availability to investors of
more reliable information. REIT prices can better reflect the performance of their
underlying assets, which improves market efficiency and transparency and reduces
the degree of information asymmetry. Arguably, it has become more difficult for
REIT and REMF managers to outperform. Thus, the assumption of constant alpha
and betas in the model may be inappropriate. We now consider time variation in
these factors, first using recursive estimates and then rolling estimates.
Recursive estimates29 are a popular method (Mamaysky et al., 2007; Cuthbertson
et al., 2008) to consider variations in the conditional performance. We use recursive
regressions, anchored on January 1992 and adding a month for each re-estimation.
In this way, we are able to examine the time patterns of the estimates of alpha and
the betas (the risk factor loadings). In Figure 1, we present the recursive estimates
of alphas from the value-weighted portfolio of active GREMFs, net of costs, relative
to the seven-factor benchmark.30 It is moot whether the initial fluctuations are
artefacts of the recursive estimation method or are real economic phenomena.
29The recursive estimates implemented in this study are based on OLS with robust standard
errors.
30Only a value-weighted portfolio of funds is considered here because the results on the equal-
weighted portfolio are similar as those on value-weighted. Similarly, we only present the findings
against the seven-factor model global model since there are no material differences across the models.
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[Figure 1 about here]
The recursive estimates of net alpha of the value-weighted portfolio of GREMFs
relative to the global market begin positive and significant in 199331 but become
insignificantly different from zero towards the end of 1994 and are then remarkably
stable around zero. There were only two funds in 1992, only three until 1995 and
fewer than 10 until 1998. The pattern of returns is consistent with the proposition of
market maturity and competition within the general mutual fund market. Similarly,
the real estate market has become more transparent, which makes it more challeng-
ing for fund managers to pick mis-priced real estate securities. And the increasing
number of funds may also compete away any abnormal performance.
The market beta starts above one but steadily falls to around 0.20, then rises
again and settles at around 0.30. The other beta coefficients, except RE, fluctuate
at the start of the estimation period but soon stabilize. SMB settles at around
0.15 but is only marginally significant at the end of the period; HML is around 0.3
and significant much of the time; and the MOM, CMA and RMW factors are not
significant. In contrast to the others, the RE coefficient has been growing steadily
over the period, from 0.28 in 1995 to 0.62 in 2016, perhaps reflecting a growing
awareness of the risks and lack of returns from global real estate investment.
Another perspective is provided by the three-year rolling window regressions of
the factors as shown in Figure 2. Alpha is always insignificantly different from zero.
Market beta is almost always below one and almost always insignificantly different
from zero until 2008, after which it rises and falls again. With the exception of RE,
the other factors fluctuate around zero and are rarely significant. The RE factor is
almost always positive and significant but has risen and fallen in cycles but these
are not obviously linked to general real estate cycles.
[Figure 2 about here]
5.2 The Diversification Benefits of the GREMF Industry
We evaluate the overall benefits from globalisation of REMFs, both before and
net of operating expenses, by regressing excess returns of active GREMFs portfolio
against the domestic seven-factor, Carhart four-factor and Fama-French five-factor
benchmarks. The results are presented in Table 5. If there were diversification
benefits, we would expect the results against the domestic benchmark to be poorer
than against the global benchmark. In fact, we find no significant result, irrespective
of the benchmarks used. The gross alphas are positive but insignificant (or negative
and insignificant in the cases of the value-weighted portfolio against the Fama-French
31Degrees of freedom restrictions mean that the first possible estimate is for September 1992. In
the figure, we present the results from January 1993.
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five-factor and seven-factor benchmarks). The inferences based on non-parametric p-
value confirm the conclusions from parametric p-value on both gross and net alphas.
[Table 5 about here]
5.2.1 Industry Diversification Benefit Recursive Estimates
Next, we repeat the analysis using recursive regressions, anchored on January 1992
and adding a month for each re-estimation.32 The results are shown in Figure 3.
[Figure 3 about here]
As with the previous recursive analysis against the global benchmark, after the
initial estimations, the recursive coefficients are remarkably stable. The recursive
estimates of alpha are not significantly different from zero throughout. The result
is clear - there are no risk-adjusted performance benefits from international diversi-
fication within GREMFs.
The market beta is around 0.25 and always significant after the initial few years.
SMB is similar is magnitude and also always significant after the initial few years.
HML, MOM and RMW are never significant; and CMA is consistently around 0.13
and on the margins of significance. Finally, after the initial period, RE is always
significant, on average around 0.70. The rolling widow estimations show some greater
volatility in the factors after the global financial crisis. Of note is the rise in the
RE factor from 2013, and the subsequent levelling off, which is also evident in the
analysis relative to the global benchmark. This was a period when rents in the U.S.
domestic real estate market were rising.
[Figure 4 about here]
5.3 Individual GREMF Managers
Before assessing the performance of individual GREMFs, we first report on model fit-
ness and on tests for independence, homoscedasticity and normality among GREMFs
returns from the selected risk-factor models.33 Comparison of the Schwarz Informa-
tion Criteria (SIC) across different models suggests that, for 77% of funds, the global
seven-factor model should be preferred. This empirical evidence further confirms our
choice of seven-factor model based on asset pricing model test.
32Similarly to the global benchmarks, as the domestic findings are robust to the benchmark used,
we only present the recursive net alphas relative to the seven-factor model
33We use the Schwarz information criterion, Lagrange Multiplier test with lags 1 and 6, the White
heteroscedasticity test, and the Sharpiro-Wilk W test.
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We use the Lagrange Multiplier test (LM test) with lags 1 and 634 to detect
whether there is serial correlation of individual GREMFs of benchmark models. Of
all funds, 69% (lag 1) and 59% (lag 6) using the seven-factor model, are shown
to exhibit serial correlation. In terms of heteroscedasticity, the White test shows
that 31% of all funds exhibit significant heteroscedasticity using the seven-factor
model. The tests for independence of the residuals indicate the adequacy of the
risk-factor models, while the tests on homoscedasticity of the residuals suggest that
the implementation of the heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator
(Eq. 4) is required.
Thus, to minimize the associated heteroscedasticity biases from the regression,
we use the heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator, and impose
a minimum of 36 observations requirement on the sample of funds that are used.
Over half of all active GREMF returns show non-normality in their returns, based
on p-values from the Sharpiro-Wilk W test that are smaller than the 10% signifi-
cance level. This finding proves that the asymptotic normal distribution is not an
appropriate approximation for the conventional t-test, so we rely on the true dis-
tribution of funds, and derive associated bootstrapped p-values for the estimated
alpha t-statistics.
We now examine the performance of individual GREMF managers using the
same procedure as for the market as a whole, and the same global and national
benchmarks, before and net of expenses. We are now interested in determin-
ing whether individual fund managers have skills. We evaluate the significance
of a fund’s performance (whether fund manager is truly skilled) by deriving the
bootstrapped p-value on alpha t-statistic, based on its associated bootstrapped
cross-sectional distribution. The associated cross-sectional bootstrapped distribu-
tion varies for each ranked fund, generated under the null hypothesis of zero-alpha
from the residual bootstrap procedure. We sort all active GREMFs based on their
ex-post t-statistic for alpha, and report the associated parametric p-value, and non-
parametric p-value for selected percentile points in the funds’ cross-section.
5.3.1 Performance of Individual Managers
Table 6 shows the results for the sorted performance (by the t-statistics for the
alphas) of individual active GREMFs, relative to the seven-factor global benchmark,
both before and net of expenses. The first row in the table reports the ex-post t-
statistic for alpha in percentiles of the performance distribution of all funds, sorted
from the bottom to the top ranked fund. The second and third rows presents the
associated alpha and its annualized value for the presented t-statistics. The fourth
and fifth rows exhibit the parametric p-value, and the bootstrapped p-value for the
associated t-statistic after 1000 residual re-sampling iterations.
34The LM test with lags 1 and 6 is also used in Cuthbertson et al. (2008).
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First, we consider outperformance, which is to the right hand side of Table 6.
Based on a significance level of 10% for the bootstrapped p-values, only the top-
ranked fund can outperform the seven-factor benchmark before expenses are taken
into account. This fund can generate sufficiently large alpha t-statistic to reject the
hypothesis that the top-ranked fund manager only achieved this performance by
luck alone. So, only this single fund exhibits skills rather than luck but the outper-
formance is lost once expenses are taken into account. For the middle-ranked funds
in the ex post cross-section distribution of the alpha t-statistics, such as between
the lower 40th percentile and the upper 40th percentile, their rankings are mostly
influenced by their expense ratios. Turning now to underperformance, and again
based on a significance level of 10% for the bootstrapped p-values, before deduc-
tions of expenses, the bottom four managers lack skills, and this rises to the bottom
five once expenses are taken into account.35
In summary, the general findings on the performance of individual active GREMF
managers are clear and are robust and consistent, and are not dependent on the
choice of the global benchmark. During the period, only one manager showed skills
before expenses were deducted but not after, and five showed lack of skills once
expenses were deducted.
[Table 6 about here]
5.3.2 Diversification Benefits of Individual Managers
We next evaluate the performance of individual active GREMF managers against
domestic benchmarks to assess whether these funds have been able to benefit from
global diversification. Table 7 presents the performance and associated statistical
significance for individual active GREMF funds, relative to the domestic seven-factor
benchmark.
[Table 7 about here]
Before deduction of expenses, we can only reject the null of no skills for the top-
ranked fund, as indicated by the p-value of 2% from the asymptotic distribution.
After deduction of expenses, this top-ranked fund still displays skills rather than
luck. In contrast, we find lack of skills, both before and after deduction of ex-
penses, among the lower 10% percentile of funds, according to both parametric and
bootstrapped p-values.36
35The results are essentially the same when the other two benchmarks are employed.
36We also implemented a series of robustness tests to examine whether the conclusions on active
GREMF performance are sensitive to: the existence of serial correlation in fund returns (using a
block bootstrap); and the change of funds samples (including incubation bias (Evans, 2010) con-
trolled, observation requirement as 60-month). Overall, the inferences on results have no qualitative
changes.
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5.3.3 Individual Fund Performance and Regional Investment Alloca-
tions
Finally, we investigate the relationship between fund performance, as measured by
fund net alpha, and the fund investment allocations within global regions. We
use cross-sectional OLS regression on 76 funds during 2002-2016. The coefficient
estimates of the performance regression of the seven-factor alphas against fund and
country characteristics are presented in Table 8.
[Table 8 about here]
Only three of the explanatory variables are found statistically significant at 10%
significance level: the fund flow, the per capita GDP and the legal system weighted
by the portfolio allocations in countries. We find a positive and significant relation-
ship between fund performance and flow, which is consistent with the smart money
hypothesis proposed by Gruber (1996). The funds with higher inflows perform
significantly better than funds experiencing outflows. This implies that GREMF
investors are able to detect the skilled funds. We take the weighted GDP per capita,
log[
∑
wi,jGDPj ], as a proxy for economic development for each fund’s portfolio.
The weight is calculated as the percentage of fund investment by country. We find
that the weighted GDP per capita makes a significant and positive contribution
to fund performance. A country with higher economic development can provide a
better educated workforce for the investment industry, leading to superior manager
performance. We confirm that there is a positive link between the weighted GDP per
capital and fund performance. We also computed the weighted score for the dummy
of law systems,
∑
wi,jDlaw,j , as a proxy for investor protection. Fund investments
in a common law legal system normally have better investor protection than in a
civil legal system. This may be due to better enforcement of contract. We find a
significantly positive relationship between legal system and fund performance.
Other fund control variables are insignificant statistically. The relationship be-
tween fund size and performance is mixed in the fund literature. We find that
there is no significant relationship between fund performance and fund size among
GREMFs. Age - log[Agei] is found to have a positive but insignificant impact on
fund performance. This can be interpreted as the cost efficiencies and increased intel-
lectual capital within funds as they grow older. Younger funds typically face higher
operational costs and are subject to insufficient experience during early years. As a
fund grows older, the accumulated intellectual capital of fund managers will lead to
a higher future performance. We find the relationship between the expenses ratio
and 12b-1 fees with fund performance insignificant. This is consistent with Chen
et al. (2004), who also find no relationship between expenses and performance. We
also find loads to make no significant contribution to better fund performance, which
is also consistent with the literature (Chen et al., 2004; Ferreira et al., 2013). Funds
can be managed either by individual or team. Funds managed by individuals have
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more flexibility but fewer resources compared with team managed funds. We find no
significant relationship between management structure and performance. According
to column two to six, the statistical significance of the relationships remains robust
for different model specifications.
6 Conclusion
This paper has considered 76 active GREMFs between 1992-2016 to examine if,
both as a sector and individually, they have genuine skills and can produce benefits
from global diversification, or if their performance is the result of luck. To do so,we
implemented a wild cross-section bootstrap which has not been used in the existing
literature. We considered both gross and net returns.
First, we examined performance relative to global benchmarks, specifically a
seven-factor benchmark derived from the global stock market and global real es-
tate market. Second, we used the domestic equivalents of the global benchmarks
to investigate the benefits from investing internationally. Third, to consider time
variation and market maturity, we calculated recursive estimates of alpha and the
beta weights in the benchmarks. Last, we used a probit model to examine the roles
of the characteristics of funds and the global regions within which they invest, in
explaining performance relative to the benchmark, as measured by net alpha. We
also implemented a series of robustness tests on both funds industry and individual
fund.
Our key results are as follows. First, the actively-managed GREMF industry, as
a whole, fails to beat any of the benchmarks. Second, the active GREMF industry,
as a whole, cannot beat U.S. domestic benchmarks, implying no significant benefit
from internationalization.
Third, at the individual GREMF level, and against the global benchmark, we
find only one manager with genuine skills but the outperformace is insufficient to
cover the management expenses, and we find four at the gross level and five at
the net level who display significant underperformance. Fourth, at the individual
GREMF level, and against the domestic benchmark, we find only one manager with
genuine skills and these persist at the net level, and we find all of the lower 10% of
managers display significant underperformance at both gross and net levels.
Fifth, we considered recursive estimates of alpha and showed that after an initial
period, alpha is consistently not significantly different from zero, the beta risk loads
are constant, although some are not significantly different from zero. Against the
global benchmark, the real estate coefficient is increasing, which we attribute to
an increased awareness of the risk of international real estate investment; whereas
against the domestic benchmark is fell between 2002-8 and then stabilized, which
we attribute to increased market maturity.
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These findings are further confirmed after a series of robustness checks are imple-
mented, including the block bootstrap (with block length as 3, 7, and 10 months) to
control for autocorrelation of each fund, the wild bootstrap with increased iterations
of 5000, the replication using the Carhart model and the Fama-French five-factor
model, and the subperiod study.
Finally, we considered which characteristics are associated with fund perfor-
mance. Three factors were significant, all positively: fund flow; and per capita GDP
and the legal systems of the countries within which a fund invests. The last two
of these may suggest better opportunities in more developed economies and with
better legal protection.
Overall, therefore, all but the very best funds exhibit no significant skills and
several exhibit a value-destroying lack of skills. These are strong findings against
several benchmarks, using appropriate methods and subject to a number of robust-
ness checks. And they are consistent for over 25 years. While these funds may be a
convenient vehicle for international real estate investment, evidence of their perfor-
mance and wider evidence on the performance of mutual funds, particularly when
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Table 1: U.S.-registered Active GREMFs Overview: Number and value of active
GREMFs for the period 1992-2016. All numbers are for the respective year end. Total
net asset value (TNA) is in millions of US dollars ($). Sector concentration of GREMFs is
measured with the Herfindahl Index.
Year Number TNA Concentration
1992 2 8.31 100.00
1993 3 146.17 100.00
1994 3 106.62 85.38
1995 3 70.76 75.61
1996 4 106.45 40.78
1997 7 634.40 48.81
1998 10 635.60 34.97
1999 10 962.70 43.08
2000 10 1057.00 48.00
2001 11 1216.10 33.95
2002 11 1671.20 23.63
2003 12 3038.00 20.25
2004 15 5681.90 21.19
2005 19 8110.40 18.88
2006 34 17176.40 9.31
2007 52 23357.60 7.12
2008 69 15497.70 4.18
2009 71 19908.50 4.35
2010 65 24047.20 4.69
2011 68 24212.90 4.67
2012 66 33683.10 4.56
2013 70 38997.00 4.52
2014 77 45030.10 5.13
2015 82 44390.40 4.92
2016 82 40664.30 5.19
26
Table 2: U.S.-registered Active GREMFs Portfolio Decomposition by Regions:
The table presents the percentage of regional risk exposure of the portfolio holdings of U.S.-
registered active GREMFs during 2002-2016 (missing data pre-2006). The data in the table
is the simple average presented in percentage.
Regional Risk Exposure of Portfolio Holdings
Year U.S. Pacific Asia Europe Africa Latin America Middle East
2002 86.09% - - - - -
2003 93.80% - - - - -
2004 89.85% 0.14% - - - -
2005 89.00% - - - - -
2006 94.10% 1.99% 3.46% 0.45% 0.00% 0.00%
2007 82.84% 9.65% 6.73% 0.60% 0.18% 0.00%
2008 85.21% 6.99% 7.27% 0.24% 0.29% 0.00%
2009 93.65% 3.23% 2.73% 0.12% 0.28% 0.00%
2010 67.79% 17.81% 12.82% 0.78% 0.78% 0.02%
2011 51.72% 26.58% 19.78% 0.79% 1.05% 0.09%
2012 51.85% 29.34% 17.27% 0.74% 0.73% 0.06%
2013 49.84% 32.51% 16.56% 0.55% 0.49% 0.05%
2014 50.25% 30.20% 18.51% 0.50% 0.44% 0.10%
2015 54.06% 25.30% 19.60% 0.60% 0.28% 0.15%
2016 55.88% 24.94% 18.34% 0.50% 0.25% 0.11%
Table 3: REMF vs. Real Estate Stock Market Indices: Summary statistics for
monthly excess return rates of the value- and equal-weighted portfolio of active GREMFs,
active domestic REMFs, the global real estate index (FTSE/NAREIT global countries in-
dex), and the domestic real estate index (U.S. Wilshire real estate securities index), from
January 1992 to December 2016.
VW Global EW Global VW Domestic EW Domestic Global Index Domestic Index
Mean 0.61 0.68 0.73 0.69 0.85 1.04
Median 0.74 0.97 1.02 1.02 1.16 1.31
Maximum 19.84 18.75 26.17 24.92 16.33 31.02
Minimum -26.05 -25.91 -28.88 -28.44 -33.53 -31.67
Std. Dev. 4.87 4.84 4.96 4.83 5.19 5.46
Skewness -0.69 -0.76 -0.78 -0.88 -1.07 -0.77













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Fund Performance vs. Regional Investment Character-
istics: We use cross-sectional OLS regression model to find the relationship
between each fund performance and the fund attributes and regional invest-
ment characteristics. The dependent variable is the net alpha estimates of
each fund alpha of global 7-factor model, and the explanatory variables in-
clude fund size, age, expenses, fees, flow, team management, GDP per capita,
liquidity and law system. The coefficient t-statistics are presented in paren-
theses.
GREMF alpha
TNA (in mil$) (log) 0.0140 0.0067 0.0152 0.0110 0.0046
(0.73) (0.34) (0.78) (0.58) (0.22)
Age (in year) (log) 0.0150 0.0416 0.0133 0.0323 0.0470
( 0.23) ( 0.63) (0.20) (0.51) (0.69)
Expense Ratio 0.0280 -0.0034 0.0263 0.0494 -0.0067
(0.35) (-0.04) (0.33) (0.63) (-0.08)
Load Fees 0.0323 0.0436 0.0303 0.0128 0.0469
(0.56) (0.76) (0.52) (0.20) (0.80)
12b-1 Fees -0.0495 -0.0342 -0.0546 -0.0268 -0.0278
(-0.31) (-0.21) (-0.33) (-0.78) (-0.17)
Flow 0.0028* 0.0027* 0.0029* 0.0040** 0.0027*
(1.79) (1.77) (1.81) (2.39) (1.69)
Team Management 0.0156 0.0065 0.0113 0.0253 0.0085
(0.30) (0.13) (0.21) (0.49) (0.16)∑




w ×Dlaw 0.0070 0.0053
(1.78*) (1.70*)
Intercept -0.3480** -2.0126* -0.3875** -0.3645** -2.2314*
(-1.99) (-1.86) (-2.02) (-2.13) (-1.78)
Obs 76 76 76 76 76
R2 16.07% 21.11% 16.67% 17.52% 21.38%
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Figure 1: Recursive Alpha and Beta Estimates Relative to Global Market: Re-
cursive coefficients of value-weighted portfolio of GREMFs, net of expenses, relative to global
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Figure 2: Three-year Rolling Window Alpha and Beta Estimates Relative to
Global Market: 36-month rolling window coefficient estimates of value-weighted portfolio
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Figure 3: Recursive Alpha and Beta Estimates Relative to Domestic Market:
Recursive coefficients of value-weighted portfolio of GREMFs, net of expenses, relative to
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Figure 4: Three-year Rolling Window Alpha and Beta Estimates Relative to
U.S. Domestic Market: 36-month rolling window coefficient estimates of value-weighted




Appendix A.1 GREMFs Portfolio Exposure
The GREMFs in CRSP, defined by Lipper investment objectives, only starts their
existence from 2008, because Lipper introduced the classification on GREMFs since
then. Other studies tend to trace back funds’ returns history, assuming no changes on
their risk exposures. However, this assumption might be problematic, because funds
may convert their investment objectives from domestic to global. Thus, we reclassify
GREMFs using Lipper’s definition, once their portfolio holdings are identified. All
securities held by domestic and GREMFs portfolios are identified manually in this
study using the domiciled country and industry classification from Datastream, the
CUSIP Master File, Bloomberg, and Financial Times. For those funds with portfolio
information missing in CRSP, we use the N-30D or N-Q filling from EDGAR37 on-
line database to fill in the gaps. In addition, there are some funds that altered
their investment objectives from U.S. domestic to global or international. Part of
their returns will be included into sample once it meets the Lipper classification of
non-U.S. stock exposure more than 25%.
Appendix A.2 Exclusion of Index Funds
To ensure our results are purely driven by fund manager active management, we also
remove the passively operated index funds, by using the ‘index fund flag’ identifier
in the CRSP database. However, strict use of this method would omit some index
funds whose inception dates are prior to 2008, because this identifier only became
available after June 2008. Thus, before 2008, we consider a fund as an index fund
only if the fund’s name contains ‘Index’, ‘Idx’, ‘Ix’, ‘Indx’, ‘NASDAQ’, ‘Nasdaq’,
‘Dow’, ‘Mkt’, ‘DJ’, ‘S & P 500’, ‘BARRA’. The use of this index dummy has been
proven accurate for an index fund coverage by Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009).
37The EDGAR database is compiled by SEC from the mandatory filings along with the fund’s
voluntarily disclosure.
37
